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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David Leroy Lee appeals from the district court's order denying his motion
to strike surplus language from the judgment of acquittal entered after the Idaho
Supreme Court vacated his conviction for failing to register as a sex offender.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
As a result of a prior conviction for lewd conduct with a minor, Lee is
required to register as a sex offender and to bi-annually confirm his address with
the sex offender registry (the "Registry"). State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, _ , 286
P.3d 537, 538 (2012).

In October 2001, Lee avoided the registration

requirement by absconding parole and, ultimately, leaving the country.

Is!:.

He

was arrested in Belize in May 2009 and was thereafter extradited to Idaho,
where the state charged him with failing to register as a sex offender in violation
of I.C. § 18-8309. Lee, 153 Idaho at _ , 286 P.3d at 538. Following a trial, a
jury found Lee guilty of the charge.

19.:.

The Idaho Supreme Court overturned

the conviction, however, holding there was insufficient evidence presented at trial
to support the jury's finding that Lee violated the registration requirements of I.C.

§ 18-8309 which, the Court held, only required Lee to notify the Registry of a
change of address within Idaho or to another state, not to another country. Lee,
153 Idaho at _ , 286 P.3d at 539-40.

The Court therefore vacated the

judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the district court "with
instructions for the entry of a judgment of acquittaL"
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19.:. at _ ,

286 P.3d at 541.

On remand, the district court entered a "Judgment of Acquittal After
Remand," the body of which states:
The defendant was convicted after a trial by jury of the
offense of Failing to Register as a Sex Offender. He registered in
Idaho, cut off his ankle monitor and fled and was eventually located
in Belize after traveling in the United States. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction by its Opinion No. 38 filed June 29, 2011.
The Supreme Court overturned that decision by its Opinion No.1 09
filed July 5,2012. Based upon the Supreme Court's decision and a
remittitur having entered, the verdict of the jury is vacated and a
judgment of acquittal is entered.
Because he is a serious
pedophile, it is hoped that the authorities will be able to keep a
closer watch on him in the future. As mandated, a judgment of
acquittal is entered.
(R., p.?)
Lee thereafter filed a "Motion To Strike Surplusage In Judgment Of
Acquittal After Remittitur," requesting the district court to remove the following
language from the judgment of acquittal: "Because he is a serious pedophile, it is
hoped that authorities will be able to keep closer watch on him in the future." (R.,
pp.8-15.) In support of his motion, Lee argued that the district court lacked both
subject matter jurisdiction and authority under I.A.R. 38 to make "any findings of
fact about Mr. Lee and his level of risk" or "to give any veiled orders to the
'authorities' on how to properly supervise him." (R., pp.9-13.) Alternatively, Lee
argued that the inclusion of the challenged language in the judgment of acquittal
violated his right to due process. (R., pp.13-14.) The district court denied Lee's
motion to strike, reasoning:
The Court entered the Judgment of Acquittal as required by
the remittitur. He prevailed on appeal because of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the statute but after he had been
sentenced, after he had a presentence report prepared and he had
been given an opportunity to challenge all the information
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contained in that report so he was afforded due process. He is
subject to a duty to register which pre-existed this case.
Presumably, the Parole Board will have access to all of the
information generated as a result of the defendant's prior offenses.
The record is abundantly clear that the defendant is a risk to
children. The Motion to Strike is denied.
(R., p.16.) Lee timely appealed. (R., pp.117-20.)
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ISSUES

Lee states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Lee's motion to
strike surplus language declaring him to be "a serious
pedophile" in need of "closer watch" by the authorities from
the judgment of acquittal because, under the language of
the remittitur, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make
such factual findings?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Lee's motion to strike surplus language declaring him to be
"a serious pedophile" in need of "closer watch" by the
authorities from the judgment of acquittal because, in doing
so, it failed to act consistently with the legal standards
applicable on remand?

3.

Did the district court violate Mr. Lee's right to procedural due
process when, without notice or a hearing, it declared him to
be "a serious pedophile" in need of "closer watch" by the
authorities?

(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Lee failed to show that the district court exceeded its subject matter
jurisdiction and/or the authority granted to it by LA.R. 38 by including in
the judgment of acquittal language that, while superfluous, has no legally
binding effect?

2.

Has Lee failed to establish any right to procedural due process in relation
to the district court's statement that Lee is "a serious pedophile" where
such statement was based on Lee's pre-existing duty to register as a sex
offender resulting from his prior conviction for lewd conduct with a minor?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Lee Has Failed To Show That The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction And/Or
Authority Under I.A.R. 38 To Include In The Judgment Of Acquittal Language
That, While Superfluous, Has No Legally Binding Effect
A.

Introduction
Lee challenges the denial of his motion to strike, arguing as he did below

that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and/or authority under
I.A.R. 38 to include in the judgment of acquittal language that Lee "is a serious
pedophile" over whom the district court "hoped that the authorities will be able to
keep a closer watch ... in the future." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-8.) Lee's argument
fails.

The district court complied with the Idaho Supreme Court's directive to

enter a judgment of acquittal, and it did not exceed its jurisdiction and/or
authority under I.A.R. 38 by including in that judgment of acquittal language, that
while superfluous, has no legally binding effect.

B.

Standard Of Review
"A claim that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction presents a

question of law over which [the appellate courts] exercise free review." State v.
Peterson, 153 Idaho 157, 160,280 P.3d 184, 187 (2012) (citing State v. Savage,
145 Idaho 756, 758, 185 P.3d 268, 270 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Parvin, 137
Idaho 783, 785, 53 P.3d 834, 836 (Ct. App. 2002)).
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C.

The District Court Did Not Exceed Its Jurisdiction And/Or Authority Under
I.A.R. 38 By Including In The Judgment Of Acquittal Superfluous
Language With No Legally Binding Effect
On remand from an opinion of the Idaho Supreme Court, the trial court

has jurisdiction to carry out the directive of the appellate court and may take
additional action only "if the action concerns a matter that is a subsidiary issue
fairly comprised in the disposition of the case." Walters v. Industrial Indemnity
Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 836,838,949 P.2d 223,225 (1997) (citing J.R. Simplot
Co. v. Chemetics International, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 258, 939 P.2d 574, 577
(1997)); accord State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883,886,11 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000);
Hummer v. Evans, 132 Idaho 830, 833, 979 P.2d 1188, 1191 (1999). "Where
the appellate court remands a cause with directions to enter judgment for one of
the parties, the judgment of the appellate court is a final judgment in the cause,
and the entry thereof in the lower court is a purely ministerial act." Mountain
Home Lumber Co. v. Swartwout, 33 Idaho 737, 197 P. 1027 (1921), quoted in
Hummer, 132 Idaho at 833, 979 P.2d at 1191; Walters, 130 Idaho at 837, 949
P.2d at 224. "A trial court has no authority to enter any judgment or order not in
conformity with the order of the appellate court."

kL.

The principle that, on remand, a trial court must comply with the mandate
of the reviewing court is also embodied in Idaho Appellate Rule 38(c). That rule
requires a trial court, upon receiving a remittitur issued upon a final appellate
opinion, to "forthwith comply with the directive of the opinion." I.A.R. 38(c); State
v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 664,667,239 P.3d 462, 465 (Ct. App. 2010).
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In Lee's prior appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated Lee's conviction
and remanded the case to the district court with directions to enter a judgment of
acquittal. State v. Lee, 153 Idaho 559, _ , 286 P.3d 537, 541 (2012). Upon
receiving the remittitur, which specifically ordered the trial court to "forthwith
comply with the directive of the Opinion" (#39107 Remittitur), the trial court
entered a judgment acquitting Lee of failing to register as a sex offender (R.,
p.7). The court thus complied with the Idaho Supreme Court's directive.
Lee concedes the trial court had jurisdiction on remand to enter the
judgment of acquittal. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-7.) He argues, however, that the
trial court exceeded its jurisdiction and/or authority under I.AR. 38 by including in
the judgment of acquittal the language: "Because [Lee] is a serious pedophile, it
is hoped that the authorities will be able to keep a closer watch on him in the
future." (Id.) The state agrees the challenged language is superfluous; however,
it is precisely because the language is superfluous and, ultimately, of no legal
effect, that it is not jurisdictionally barred.
In all the cases Lee relies on for the proposition that, on remand, a trial
court cannot take any action beyond that directed by the appellate court, the trial
court was either asked to take or actually took some action that was not only
beyond that specifically directed by the appellate court, but was also of legal
significance to the case. See Hosey, 134 Idaho at 885-86, 11 P.3d at 1103-04
(on remand from appellate opinion directing reconsideration of suppression
issue, district court had jurisdiction to consider defendant's motion to withdraw
guilty plea because effect of appellate court's ruling under terms of plea
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agreement was necessarily subsidiary to appellate court's directive on remand
where defendant entered conditional plea); Hummer, 132 Idaho at 832-33, 979
P.2d at 1190-91 (trial court lacked jurisdiction on remand from opinion directing
entry of an amended judgment to consider plaintiff's renewed request for
attorney fees); Walters, 130 Idaho at 837-38, 949 P.2d at 224-25 (on remand
from appellate opinion reversing trial court's order denying motion to dismiss,
trial court had no jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs motion to amend complaint).
Lee has not cited any case, and the state is not aware of any, that holds a trial
court exceeds its jurisdiction and/or authority under a remittitur by including in a
judgment or order it was specifically directed to enter language that, while
extraneous, is ultimately of no legal effect.
In this case, the trial court took no legally significant action beyond that
specifically directed by the Idaho Supreme Court.

As required both by the

Court's opinion and the remittitur that followed, the trial court entered a judgment
of acquittal. That the trial court included in the judgment of acquittal its own view
of the risk Lee poses to society does not demonstrate that the court exceeded its
jurisdiction.

The trial court's assessment was based on its own view of the

record (see R., p.16); it was not an order, "veiled" or otherwise, that would
compel law enforcement to take any particular action in its continued supervision
of Lee (see R., pp.11-12 (defense counsel arguing in support of motion to strike
that challenged language in judgment of acquittal constituted a "veiled order[] to
the 'authorities' on how to properly supervise [Lee]").
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Because the language Lee challenges is of no legal significance, the
district court did not exceed its jurisdiction and/or authority under I.A.R. 38 by
including it in the judgment of acquittal. Lee has failed to establish any basis for
reversal.

II.
Lee Has Failed To Establish Any Right To Procedural Due Process In Relation
To The District Court's Statement That Lee Is A "Serious Pedophile"
A.

Introduction
Lee argues that, even if the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction and/or

authority under I.A.R. 38, it nevertheless "violated his right to procedural due
process when it declared him to be 'a serious pedophile' in need of 'closer watch'
by the authorities." (Appellant's brief, pp.9-11.) Correct application of procedural
due process principles to the facts of this case shows Lee's argument to be
without merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Cantrell, 139 Idaho 409, 411, 80 P.3d 345, 347 (Ct. App.
2003). A claim that a defendant's due process rights were violated is a question
of law, subject to free review. State v. Gilpin, 132 Idaho 643, 649, 977 P.2d 905,
911 (Ct. App. 1999).
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C.

Lee Has Failed To Establish Any Violation Of His Right To Procedural
Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
Procedural due process requires that, except in extraordinary circumstances, "a
person, whose protected rights are being adjudicated," must receive notice and
an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
State v. Smith, 146 Idaho 822, 828, 203 P.3d 1221, 1227 (2009) (citations
omitted).

'''Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at

stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity
to be heard are essential.'"

19.:. at 826, 203 P.3d at 1226 (quoting Wisconsin v.

Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)). However, where an individual '''has
already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest'" a particular
finding, no additional process is due.

19.:. at 828, 203 P.3d at 1227 (quoting

Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003)).
Applying the foregoing principles in Smith, the Idaho Supreme Court
struck down as violative of procedural due process a statutory scheme governing
the designation of convicted sex offenders as violent sexual predators (VSP).
Smith, 146 Idaho at 828, 203 P.3d at 1227. Specifically, the Court held that
because designation as a VSP was based on a factual determination of probable
future conduct and resulted in heightened and continuing legal obligations and
registration requirements, due process required that an offender be afforded
notice and a meaningful opportunity to challenge that designation.
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19.:. The Court

was careful, however, to distinguish "Idaho's VSP system from a sex offender
registry based solely on the fact of conviction of a predicate offense," explaining
that, "[a]s to the latter, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that sex
offender registration laws do not violate the offender's procedural due process
rights, noting the offender 'has already had a procedurally safeguarded
opportunity to contest' the charge.'''

lil (quoting Doe,

538 U.S. at 7).

Relying on Smith, Lee argues as he did below that, by labeling him a
"serious pedophile" over whom the trial court hoped "authorities will be able to
keep a closer watch ... in the future," the district court placed upon him a "badge
of infamy" that triggered his right to procedural due process. (Appellant's brief,
pp.10-11.) Lee is incorrect for two reasons.
First, unlike Smith, whose VSP "badge of infamy" was based on a factual
determination of future conduct, Lee has not been given any badge of
designation not already fairly attributed to him as a result of his prior conviction
for lewd conduct with a minor under 16 and the resulting requirement that he
register as a sex offender.

Indeed, as noted by the district court in its order

denying Lee's motion to strike, Lee has already been afforded notice and an
opportunity to be heard and to contest the facts giving rise to his prior convictions
and his duty to register. (See R., p.16 (noting Lee was provided presentence
report and had opportunity to challenge all information contained therein).)
Second, also unlike the VSP designation at issue in Smith, the district
court's statement that Lee is a "serious pedophile" and its expressed "hope" that
authorities will supervise him more closely in the future does not impose upon
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Lee any burden or consequence beyond that already required by his pre-existing
duty to register. The statement was merely dicta and did not purport or operate
to adjudicate any of Lee's protected rights.
The district court's statement that Lee is a "serious pedophile" was not a
new factual finding and does not deprive, or even threaten to deprive, Lee of any
life, liberty or property not already at stake by virtue of his prior convictions. As
such, Lee has failed to demonstrate that his right to procedural due process is
even implicated, much less violated, by the inclusion of that statement in the
judgment of acquittal.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order denying Lee's motion to strike.
st

DATED this 21 day of May 2013.

A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney Genera
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21 st day of May 2013, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SPENCERJ.HAHN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

LAF/pm
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